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Foundations of Global Computing
Resource Control
Programming Languages
Semantic Theories
Models for Concurrency
Global Ubiquitous Computing:
computation over a global network of
mobile, bounded resources shared among
mobile entities which move between highly
dynamic, largely unknown, untrusted
networks.
Diculties:
Extreme dynamic recongurability; lack of
coordination and trust; limited capabilities;
partial knowledge ...
Issues:
Protection and management of resources;
privacy and condentiality of data; ...
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Indirect Border Crossing
Trojan Horses: The system
Odysseus[inHorse:outHorse:Destroy] j Horse[inTroy] j Troy[Trojans]
is well-typed under assumptions:
Odysseus : amb[Achaean;cross(Toy)]
Horse : amb[Toy;cross(City)]
Troy : amb[City; ]
However, the system may evolve to
Troy[Trojans j Horse[ ] j Odysseus[Destroy]]
where Odysseus got inside Troy's Walls taking by surprise the Trojans.
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Types
Groups: G;H;:::
Sets of groups: P;S;::: U The universal set of groups
Ambients types:
A ::= amb[G; M] amb of group G;with mobility type M
Process types:
 ::= proc[G; M] process that can be enclosed in an ambient of group G;
may drive to ambients whose groups are in M
Capability types:
K ::= cap[G; M] capability that can appear in an ambient of group G;
may drive it to ambients whose groups are in M
Mobility types:
M ::= mob[P] mobility specs: where processes are allowed to reside
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Detecting Odysseus' intentions
Now, in order to assign a type to
Odysseus[inHorse:outHorse:Destroy] j Horse[inTroy] j Troy[Trojans]
we need assumptions of the form:
Odysseus : amb[Achaean;mob[fGround;Toy;Cityg]]
Horse : amb[Toy;mob[fGround;Cityg]]
Troy : amb[City; ]
representing that Odysseus is an Achaean intentioned to move into a City!
On the other hand, under assumptions of the form
Odysseus : amb[Achaean;mob[fGround;Toyg]]
the Trojans should not fear any attack from Odysseus.
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Secrecy and Adversaries
Intuitively:
A process preserves the secrecy of a piece of data M if it does not publish M, or
anything that would permit the computation of M.
S-Adversary: A context A( ) which initially knows names and capabilities in S:
Revealing Names: P may reveal n to S if there exists an S-adversary A( ) and a
name c 2 S such that:
A(P) =) C(c[hni j Q]) (c free)
Typing System: Secrecy is captured by a type system ` which may classify
processes as untrusted   ` P : Un, and data as public a : Public if it can be
exchanged with untrusted process.
Secrecy Theorem: Well-typed processes do not reveal their secrets publicly. Formally, if
  ` P : Un and   0 s : Public, then P preserves the secrecy of s from all public
channels, i.e. from fa j   ` a : Publicg. (Payload s won't be entrusted to a public a.)
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Trust Management
Focus on Trust Evolution and Delegation in Dynamic Networks
af A g
Focus on Trust Evolution and Delegation in Dynamic Networks
af A g principal P
agent/behaviour
trust policy: expressions on lattice (D;)
Trust Based Services:
af b:`hvi:A g j bf `(x):tBt g  ! af A g j bf B(a)fx := vg g
Trust Evolution:
af  :A j B g  ! af A j B g()
Policies and Expressions:
 ::= ppq delegation  ::= t 2 D value/var
x : P: abstraction (p) policy value
op(1;:::;n) lattice op e 7! ; choice
p ::= a 2 P; x : P principal/vars e ::=  cmp  ; p eq p comparisons
e bop e boolean op
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Understanding Delegation
Example:
a : p 7! trusted; b : p 7! paq(p);
q 7! pbq(q); q 7! untrusted;
z 7! ppq(z); z 7! paq(z);
Delegation, formally: Global trust as a xpoint.
 : (P ! P ! D) ! (P ! D) Local Policy
 : (P ! P ! D) ! (P ! P ! D) Collected Policies
Global Trust: x() : P ! P ! D. But, is this good enough?
p : trusted q : untrusted z : ???
Cannot confuse don't trust with don't know: the value of ppq(z) could become
available later.
Need to account for uncertain knowledge of ppq(z) 2 D.
Swansea 4.03.04 { pp.15/28 n o 
Understanding Delegation
Example:
a : p 7! trusted; b : p 7! paq(p);
q 7! pbq(q); q 7! untrusted;
z 7! ppq(z); z 7! paq(z);
Delegation, formally: Global trust as a xpoint.
 : (P ! P ! D) ! (P ! D) Local Policy
 : (P ! P ! D) ! (P ! P ! D) Collected Policies
Global Trust: x() : P ! P ! D. But, is this good enough?
p : trusted q : untrusted z : ???
Cannot confuse don't trust with don't know: the value of ppq(z) could become
available later.
Need to account for uncertain knowledge of ppq(z) 2 D.
Swansea 4.03.04 { pp.15/28 n o 
Understanding Delegation
Example:
a : p 7! trusted; b : p 7! paq(p);
q 7! pbq(q); q 7! untrusted;
z 7! ppq(z); z 7! paq(z);
Delegation, formally: Global trust as a xpoint.
 : (P ! P ! D) ! (P ! D) Local Policy
 : (P ! P ! D) ! (P ! P ! D) Collected Policies
Global Trust: x() : P ! P ! D. But, is this good enough?
p : trusted q : untrusted z : ???
Cannot confuse don't trust with don't know: the value of ppq(z) could become
available later.
Need to account for uncertain knowledge of ppq(z) 2 D.
Swansea 4.03.04 { pp.15/28 n o 
A Calculus of Bounded Capacities: Movement
Fundamentals: Space Conscious Movement
a[ inb:P j Q ] j b[ j R ] & j b[ a[ P j Q ] j R ]
j b[ a[ outb:P j Q ] j R ] & a[ P j Q ] j b[ j R ]
Example: Travelling needs but consumes no space.
a[ inb:inc:outc:outb:0 ] j b[ j c[ ] ]
&& j b[ j c[ a[ outc:outb:0 ] ] ]
&& a[ 0 ] j b[ j c[ ] ]
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A Calculus of Bounded Capacities: Spawning
Fundamentals: Space Conscious Process Activation
.kP j k & P
Fundamentals: Space Conscious Process Activation
.kP j k & P passive process:
weighs 0
P weighs k
Example: Replication: !k, !.k
!.kP j k & !.kP j P
Types ensure only 0-weighted processes are replicable: One must use spawning,
so that replication needs space proportional to the process' weight.
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A Calculus of Bounded Capacities: Transfer
Fundamentals: Space Acquisition and Release
put a:P j j ak[ get :Q j R ] & P j ak+1[ Q j j R ]
ak+1[ put:P j j S ] j bh[ geta:Q j R ] & ak[ P j S ] j bh+1[ Q j j R ]
Example: A Memory Module
memMod , mem[ 256MB j !put j !getfree ]
malloc , m[ !getmem:free[ outm:getm:put ] j !put ]
memMod j malloc &256MB mem[ !put j !getfree ] j m[ 256MB j ::: ] &2256MB
mem[ !put j !getfree ] j malloc j free256MB[ j put ] &256MB memMod j malloc j :::
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A System of Capacity Types
Capacity Types: ;::: are pairs of nats [n;N], with n  N.
Eect Types E;::: are pairs of nats (d;i), representing decs and incs.
Exchange Types:  ::= Shh j Ambh;i j CaphE;i
Process and Ambient and Capability Types:
a : Ambh;i a has no less than m and no more than M spaces
P : Prochk;E;i P weighs k and produces the effect E on ambients
C : CaphE;i C transforms processes adding E to their effects
Thm: Subject Reduction: Well-typed processes preserve space.
If   ` P : Prochk;E;i and P & Q then   ` Q : Prochk;E0;i for some E0 l E.
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